When a loved one dies, it is typical to be very sad for a while, and gradually feel less sad. If disrespected by a peer, you may be very angry for a while, but then get over it. Likewise for regret over mistakes you made, and some other emotional responses to events in our lives—they tend to fade with time. Some philosophers argue that these tendencies toward diminution of affect must be unfitting. They involve a systematic failure to properly track the (dis)values to which they putatively respond. After all, the reason to be sad is the loss of the beloved, the reason to be angry is the disrespectful treatment, the reason for regret is the stupid thing you did. Those facts are permanent, so it is fitting to be sad, angry, regretful… forever. (These philosophers can allow that we often have good reasons to try to rid ourselves of such emotions, but those are “wrong kinds” of reason that do not speak to the fittingness of the response.) This talk will offer a novel defense of a norm for fitting diminution of emotional responses over time, grounded in considerations of emotional proportionality. Along the way, it will consider what norms of fittingness are, and what to make of attributions of emotions that persist over days, months or years.